On Saturday, Israeli tanks and troops began maneuvering ever closer to Gaza City’s outskirts in preparation for a full-scale offensive. Eyewitness accounts reported intensified shelling as Israel is moving toward what could be the defining battle of its war against Hamas terrorists: the capture of Gaza City.
Israel’s security cabinet approved the operation, known as Gideon’s Chariots B, and has deployed up to five IDF divisions toward the city’s outskirts—a highly significant mobilization. Thousands of reservists—some 60,000—have been called up.
John Spencer, chair of urban warfare studies at the Madison Policy Forum and executive director of the Urban Warfare Institute, told Fox News Digital the scale of this operation is unprecedented. ‘This will be a bigger challenge than anything the IDF has faced, arguably ever. It is the densest location in Gaza, the heart of Hamas’s stronghold. And you don’t really know what the tunnels are until you get into them.’
Spencer said that ‘Hamas built semi-circles of defenses oriented at Israel. But the IDF has shown creativity in maneuvering around obstacles.’ Israel plans to send more combat power into Gaza City than it has deployed across the entire Strip thus far. ‘If your goal is to clear Gaza City of Hamas’s military capabilities and search for hostages, you need that scale,’ he said.
Gadi Shamni, former commander of the Gaza Division and ex-head of IDF Central Command, told Fox News Digital, ‘It is a crowded city with refugee camps, dense neighborhoods, high-rises and a highly developed underground. People say the IDF controls above and below ground, but in the last campaign we saw that wasn’t always true. Even when you destroy tunnels, Hamas can rebuild them quickly. The longer you stay with more forces, the more opportunities you create for the other side to attack.’
A former senior Israeli security official, speaking on the condition of anonymity, told Fox News Digital, ‘The IDF can militarily conquer Gaza, but the costs will be immense on both sides. The IDF will fight with a method of ‘destroy everything first’—air force bombs, massive charges, detonating streets from afar, wiping out entire areas and advancing slowly.
‘The IDF has gained enormous experience over the past two years and will use those tactics in this battle. … You are strong, the enemy is weak, and you have patience. Even the weather is on Israel’s side, with winter not arriving until January.’
The tunnels remain the most formidable element of Hamas’s defense. Unlike ISIS terrorists in Mosul, Spencer said, Hamas has built an underground tunnel network that allows commanders and fighters to move between positions avoid strikes, and conceal hostages. ‘The IDF that will go into Gaza City is not the IDF of 2023,’ Spencer said, pointing to rapid adaptations in the use of drones, robots, and specialized units for tunnel warfare. ‘They’ve learned so much. But this will still be slow, very careful, and costly.’
To illustrate the scale, Spencer pointed to the 2004 battle for Fallujah in Iraq. ‘It took the Marine Corps about two weeks to clear Fallujah—every single home, building, shop. About 68,000 structures were cleared, as if somebody physically looked in them,’ he said. ‘If all five of these [IDF] divisions were doing that, absolutely, you could get it done in a few months. But the enemy always gets a vote. You can’t rush to failure.’
The former Israeli senior security official described the operation as ‘telescopic—very slow, with pistons working one by one. This pace also gives Hamas the chance at every stage to try to cut a deal.’
On the fate of hostages possibly held in Gaza City, the official was blunt: ‘Some of the hostages will die. I wouldn’t be surprised if more brigades are brought in—the IDF is using immense ground power to seize urban terrain.’
Shamni also warned Hamas may relocate hostages, 50 hostages, of whom 20 are still believed to be alive, into combat zones to deter strikes—a tactic he said the IDF would be reluctant to engage for fear of harming captives, a conflict between military necessity and core values.
Shamni highlighted a particularly fraught dilemma: evacuating civilians. ‘You don’t know who will leave, how many will leave, how they’ll react—or whether Hamas will even allow them to leave,’ he said. ‘I assume many will not evacuate, and then you face the hard dilemma of fighting in a place full of noncombatants.’
Spencer added that history shows around 10% of civilians stay behind. ‘Even 10% of a million is 100,000 people,’ he said.
Shamni forecast a protracted operation: ‘It could take months. Two months might seize the surface, but then you still have to clear tunnels. It will cost many lives—including civilians. The worst-case scenario is that no hostages are found alive or dead because of the destruction.’
Shamni, who also served as Israel’s military attaché in Washington, warned that the dual goals of defeating Hamas and returning hostages are contradictory, risking years of drawn-out fighting.
Spencer, however, called the decision to press forward a ‘calculated risk,’ explaining that while military action carries dangers, ‘you weigh the risk of Hamas killing the hostages against the certainty that they’re being starved and tortured. Military pressure is the last resort. Without conquering Gaza City, Hamas will continue to hold a sanctuary.’
