Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent and U.S. Trade Representative Jamieson Greer met with Chinese Vice Premier He Lifeng and Commerce Minister Li Chenggang in Madrid last week. They announced a ‘framework agreement’ over TikTok, the Chinese-owned app used by millions of Americans.
But the story isn’t only about TikTok. It’s also about how America uses TikTok as a lever – and why that lever is more necessary than ever.
TikTok is an important issue in and of itself: control over data, algorithmic influence, foreign ownership – all of which are critical for national security. In addition, however, TikTok is a tool the U.S. can and should use in ongoing trade engagement, as well as to counter China’s growing leverage in rare earths, critical minerals and semiconductors.
When I served in President Donald Trump’s first administration (‘Trump 45’), the core issues we confronted included a massive trade imbalance, intellectual property theft, cyber-theft and China’s Belt and Road infrastructure expansion. These were predatory practices in trade, tech and finance. Today, in ‘Trump 47,’ the battlefront has broadened – but one thing that hasn’t changed is the psychological warfare the Chinese employ any time negotiations are underway.
I was at the center of one of the most dramatic examples of this during Trump 45…
After an exhausting month of prep work, I boarded my flight to Beijing in March 2018 with wary optimism. I had worked intensively leading up to this trip, drafting a comprehensive framework document outlining a new trade deal with China, a proposal that would overhaul virtually every aspect of the U.S.-China economic relationship.
We’d sent the proposal to our Chinese counterparts several days earlier, and now our high-level trade delegation was en route to Beijing to negotiate the largest change to trade relations in at least 10 years. The cast of characters illustrates just how significant this trade deal could be. It included Secretary Steven Mnuchin (head of the delegation), Under Secretary David Malpass and me (Treasury), Secretary Wilbur Ross (Commerce), U.S. Trade Representative Robert Lighthizer and several of his deputies, NEC Director Larry Kudlow, Under Secretary Ted McKinney (Agriculture), and Peter Navarro (special assistant to the president and director of trade and manufacturing policy).
We arrived at the U.S. Embassy in Beijing with about an hour to review our plans one more time before we had to depart for Diaoyutai – the state guest house where Mao and every leader since has entertained foreign dignitaries. But there was a surprise waiting for us at our embassy:a brand-new proposal, drafted by the Chinese, which they were putting forth at the eleventh hour, and which we had never seen. It was about 15 pages long – and completely in Chinese!
I was one of the few people in the room who could read it. After a quick scan, I told the group: ‘This is wholly unacceptable. This document doesn’t say anything – they’re just messing with us.’ A heated debate ensued over how to respond, and how the Chinese were likely to react. But there was no time to reach a consensus; it was time to leave for Diaoyutai.
There was a mass exit from the secure room where we met at the embassy, and, almost like a well-choreographed ballet with a hundred moving parts, we all shuffled to our designated cars. As Secretary Mnuchin stepped into the limousine to take us to the meeting, Malpass insisted that I ride with the secretary and pushed me into the seat next to Mnuchin, saying, ‘We need to know exactly what this says – can you translate it on the way?’
As we sped through the streets of Beijing, I sat in the back seat, literally shvitzing as a technical term in Chinese got the better of me, and furiously translated as I read out loud, in English, what the Chinese had dropped in our laps.
Even as we climbed the stairs into the building and entered the meeting room, none of us was quite sure how Mnuchin was going to handle this hot potato. After Vice Premier Liu He’s flowing stream of diplomatic pleasantries welcoming us to China, the secretary calmly stated in response, ‘We received your draft. Thanks for sending it over – but we’re going to use our draft for today.’ It wasn’t the preamble they expected. But it was entirely consistent with the new tone that President Trump had set from the day he took office.
Today, China has moved from using tariffs and IP theft to controlling choke points – especially in rare earth elements, critical minerals, semiconductors and advanced manufacturing capacity. The numbers are clear indicators of China’s leverage.
China accounts for about 70 % of global rare earth mining and about 90 % of the world’s rare earth refining and separation capacity. In 2023, China controlled 61 % of global mining of rare earth magnet elements and 92 % of refining capacity for those magnets.
On semiconductors: while U.S. companies remain strong in chip design and advanced R&D, China’s share of the semiconductor industry’s value-added has surged (from about 8 % in 2001 to over 30 % by 2016), and China is pushing aggressively to become self-sufficient in mature node production.
These are not passive metrics. They are active levers China already uses in the trade negotiations through export restrictions, licensing controls or by threatening disruptions. For example, in April 2025 China – clearly in response to President Trump’s bold tariff moves – added export licenses and restrictions for seven heavy rare earth elements, including dysprosium, terbium, samarium, plus rare earth magnets—materials critical to EV motors, wind turbines, electronics and defense systems.
The challenges faced in Trump’s first term have only evolved – not eased. The trade deficit is large, IP and tech theft are growing more dangerous, predatory development finance practices continue and China’s leverage in rare earths, semiconductors and control over supply chains threatens global development and American autonomy.
TikTok is a headline issue impacting critical issues of data, influence and national security. But it is also an essential lever to counter the new pressure points China is pressing. Madrid and Friday’s Trump–Xi call offer a chance to reshape this broader contest.
As I demonstrate in ‘A Seat at the Table,’ President Trump’s strategy and policies during his first administration allowed us to exert maximum pressure on our counterparts and to stay the course with firm negotiating positions and clear red lines. Last week’s dialogues demonstrate that Trump will continue to insist on substance over symbolism, an approach critical to our national interest.
